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ABSTRACT
Existing international space law as well as the best interest of all
nations are consistent with the establishment of a user - based interna-
tional organization, herein called INTERMARS. INTERbIARS would provide
access to facilities and services at a Martian base which would be of
high functional potential, quality, safety and reliability. These oppor-
tunities would be available on an open and non - discriminatory basis to
all peaceful users and investors.
INTEFJ4ARS is a model organization concept tailored to provide
cooperative international management of a Martian base for the benefit of
its members, users and investors. Most importantly, INTERMARS would
provide such management through a sharing of both sovereignty and oppor-
tunity rather than unilateral control by any one nation or set of com-
peting nations.
Through an Assembly of Parties, a Board of Governors, a Board of
Users and Investors and a Director General, INTEPJ4ARS would meet its
primary goal as it would be in the self-interest of all members, users
and investors to do so. The internal structure and philosophy of INTER-
MARS would provide not only for all participants to have representation
in decisions affecting its activities, but also would insure effective
and responsive management. Surely this is the precedent we wish to
establish for mankind at the now not-so-dlstant shores of the new ocean
of space.
INTRODUCTION
People throughout the world want space to be a frontier for human
cooperation as well as a frontier of freedom and achievement. Unfor-
tunately, the narrow political designs as well as the legitimate national
interests of the nations of the world make broad cooperation in any area
very difficult.
Such cooperation, however, is not impossible. The success of the
ApoIlo-Soyuz mission in 1974 and various Sovlet-French efforts shows that
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Joint efforts Involving international adversaries are possible, at least
if objectives are relatively limited and well-defined. The very suc-
cessful Spacelab, developed by the European Space Agency and flown by the
United States on the Space Shuttle demonstrates the potential for very
close cooperation between free nations. Most importantly, in the INTELSAT
and INMARSAT telecommunication organizations, we have examples where
nations of all levels of economic development and all varieties of
political persuasion have found it in their self-interest to cooperate in
space-related projects.
If we are to see broadly based International cooperation in space,
we must first see a commitment to the rule of a body of space law.
Although not perfect, and certainly not complete, currently recognized
and internationally sanctioned tenets of space law provide a workable
base for future cooperation. The free world, however, must be very
cautious about agreeing to any partial or total legal framework for space
that either limits rational free enterprise activities or allows the one-
nation, one-vote control of cooperative organizations. The United Na-
tions developed "Moon Treaty" and "Law of the Sea Convention" are
examples of the dangers of ill-conceived and badly negotiated new inter-
national law based on extreme applications of the otherwise acceptable
notion that the Moon and the sea are the "common heritage of mankind".
Fortunately, few nations have ratified these documents, nor should they
be ratified without major amendment.
Currently, recognized principles in space law, as established by
International treaties, are reasonably general and straightforward:
(1) Space, including celestial bodies, is the province of mankind and
should be developed for its benefit; (2) Space, including celestial
bodies, should be free for access, exploration, scientific investigation
and use by all countries; (3) Space, Including celestial bodies, is not
subject to national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of
use or occupation, or by any other means; (4) Space, including celestial
bodies, shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; and (5) Interna-
tional law as formulated on Earth extends to space and celestial bodies.
These five principles, which have developed slowly over the last 25
years, are embodied in several multilateral treaties now in force, but
most particularly in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. They provide the
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currently recognized international legal framework for Initiating,
planning and implementing international cooperation in space.
The principal new notion currently being explored as a possible
basic tenet of space law is that which states that space and all celes-
tial bodies are the "common heritage of mankind". Not only is this notion
somewhat inconsistent with the ongoing search for extraterrestrial
intelligence, but it is seriously flawed in its more extreme application
as currently embodied in the proposed 1979 "Agreement Ooverning the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies", or "Moon
Treaty", and 1982 "Law of the Sea Convention". Under the "common heri-
tage of mankind" notion, several new principles of space law, as they
apply to the Moon, would be added to the list given above.
First, a celestial body, such as Mars, or any part of it would not
be subject to appropriation by any entity, including private, corporate,
national, or international interests. It would be owned or possessed by
no one.
Second, all nations would share equally in the management of activi-
ties in space. National and limited international interests would be
subordinate to so-called universal interests.
Third, any benefits from the exploitation of natural resources in
space would be shared by all nations, not just those who developed the
capability to exploit such reaources.
The principal theoretical difficulty many see in the implementation
of a "common heritage" regime is that unless there is international
consensus on significant issues of administration, the resources of space
would go unused indefinitely. Issues put to a vote would be divided on a
one-nation, one-vote basis which would ultimately politicize decision-
making. The practical difficulties in operating under comparable regimes
of consensus and one-nation, one-vote principles are becoming
Increasingly evident in the politicization of international agencies such
as UNESCO, the International Telecommunications Union and the World
Intellectual Property Organization, not to mention the United Nations,
itself. The stagnation of such agencies and their increasing antagonism
toward the principles of the free flow of information and basic human
rights is forcing nations back to bilateral and multilateral agreements
in order to get anything done.
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As It has been for 25 years and, as is international law In general,
space law must continue to evolve subject to the realities of national
and International interests and activities in space. It must adapt to
changing political and technical conditions.
For example, the free world Is already moving toward free enterprise
commercialization of near-Earth orbit facilities. Does this violate any
of the principles enumerated above? In the eyes of communist and many
developing nations, it probably does. What about the hard resources of
space, those in the Moon, planets and asteroids? Are they forever off-
limits to free enterprise? probably not. Therefore, the question becomes
national or international regime will such activities be
at least some permanent space stations will be the
territory of single nations or limited groups of nations.
Does this violate the letter or intent of the current principles?
Obviously, It would seem to. Moreover, can we assume that territorial
sovereignty will not be claimed for the first lunar or Martian bases if
established by national entities as current trends would indicate they
will be? Thus, It would seem that In space the concept of "functional"
sovereignty is already clearly established. Functional sovereignty ls
considered the right of states or cooperating groups of states to
exercise Jurisdiction and control over assets and activities they have in
space. Whether or not functional sovereignty wlll replace, or be re-
placed by, territorial sovereignty, only time and circumstances will
tell.
Finally, It is clear to all, space ls not being used exclusively for
"peaceful" purposes in spite of treaty agreements to the contrary. It Is
probably unreasonable to assume that any new geographical frontier can be
immune from either plans for aggression or the need to defend against
aggression. There are no clear historical precedents to indicate this is
possible, particularly when presence at that geographical frontier has
significant implications for the balance of power between nations.
BACKGROUND
The next major cruclble of legal experimentation and development in
space law will probably come when men and nations return to the Moon to






significant legal constraints on nations interested in the establlshment
of permanent Martian bases. The obvious practlcal difficulties the world
is experiencing wlth one-nation, one-vote international organlzations
provides significant pragmatic constraints on nations interested in
international partlcipatlon in a space base or settlement. Further, to
realize the many recognized psychologlcal, political and technlcal bene-
fits of international participation in Martian base activities, the
management regime of such a base must offer clear self-interest incen-
tives to particlpation by major powers rather than the alternative of
"going it alone" and "damn the legal torpedoes".
Fortunately, we have international experience with a successful
model of a high-technology management system. This system conforms to
the legal, operatlonal and self-lnterest constraints that exists on
international operations in space. This model system is INTELSAT, a user-
based management organization for the operation of international tele-
communications satellites. (1)
The political and technical management of a global communication
satellite system, as manifested by the INTELSAT organization, is a unique
new entry into the international scene. It is an organization that deve-
loped because of a coincidence of new technology and obvious inter-
national need. To the everlasting credit of the United States, we
perceived this coincidence and guided the gradual trial-and-error
development of INTELSAT. To the everlasting credit of the INTELSAT
organization, it has become an example of international coperation that
is not only remarkably successful, but also utilitarian and profitable.
The INTELSAT model has already spawned one successful imitator,
INMARSAT, which manages International maritime communication satellites
and includes the Soviet Union as a member. Modified versions of this
model have been proposed for the management of international
waterways {2)--, space-based antenna farms and lunar bases (3) Here we
suggest consideration of another modified version of the INTELSAT manage-
ment model which is appropriate to the international management of a
Martian base.
We believe that "INTERMARS ''{4), as we have termed this suggested
organization, would satisfy all the previously discussed constraints of
space law as well as be consistent wlth the prlnclples of free enterprise
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which are held so dear in democracies of the world. Most importantly,
INTERR_RS would bring into the management of a Martian base those nations
and other interests with the greatest motivations for insuring the
successful implementation of that management.
The concept of INTERMARS is a concept of the space age and of the
recognition that space resources are common resources of the spaceship
Earth. INTERIORS does not require that territorial sovereignty be given
up in space; it does not require that free-enterprise opportunities be
abandoned in space; it merely requires that sovereignty and opportunity
be shared.
BASIS FOR INTERMARS CONCEPT
Technological advancements have produced a trend towards realization
of a "common heritage of mankind" in certain international resources.
This trend is most apparent in negotiations regarding the resources of
the seas and outer space. It indicates a general realization that nations
have common interests ih sharing benefits from the exploitation and
environmentally sound use of these resources.
It must be recognized that Mars can become a common heritage
resource for mankind. It also must be recognized that Mars will'not be
available to mankind without a workable management system and a peaceful
management environment. An institutional arrangement should be possible
which would vest operation and control of Martian bases in an organiza-
tion composed of nations who will actively participate in creating such
bases with association of those other entities who are solely users of
the bases or investors in the technologies required to establish them.
Such nations and entities would be united by a common bond of policy and
purpose which would be focused on both the technical and financial
success of the enterprise.
The advantages of sharing sovereignty and opportunity under this
concept should be clear. First, the potentially disastrous discontent
over which nation should exert control over Martian operations would be
largely alleviated.
Second, the concept can provide institutionalized access
influence to all participants. Nations, users and investors with





eliminating the possibility that small or temporarily small participants
could be frozen out entirely,
Third, the operational objectives of a base or settlement would be
best met by this concept. The most important of these objectives are (1)
assuring access by all members to the base and its services; (2) assuring
access to proprietary technologies and available material resources in
proportion to investment; (3) assuring access to Martian scientific
resources; (4) maintaining reasonable and uniform rate structures bearing
a realistic relationship to the value derived from the use of the base
(and of spacecraft moving to and from it) while also considering
operating expenses and return on investment; (5) assuring administrative
stability over long periods of time; (6) assuring effective maintenance
and operation of facilities and services; and, (7) assuring continued and
environmentally sound expansion, improvement and development of space-
craft, facilities, and services.
Finally, creation of an international organization of all nations,
users and investors who wish to actively participate in the excitement of
space pioneering cannot help but improve the friendship and unity of
purpose of nations and peoples on Earth.
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
The conceptual advantages of a user-based international organization
will only be realized if the actual institutional structure is designed
to provide an equitable system for the various interests to exert
influence and control, as well as provide for efficient and proper
management of the base.
There are two distinct mechanisms for nations, users and investors
to be involved in INTERMARS. The first mechanism relates to the creation
and operation of a Martian base. It draws to it those nations that
contribute directly and substantively to the activities required to
establish the base and stabilize its initial operation. The second
mechanism relates to the use and the terms and conditions for use of tile
base, its accessible resources and the proprietary technologies required
to establish it. This second mechanism draws to it those nations, users
and investors who contract with or invest in INTERMARS in order to bene-
fit from its activities.
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The main functioning bodies within INTERMARS would be the Assembly
of Parties, the Board of Governors, the Board of Users and Investors and
the Director General's office. The member nations of the Assembly of
Parties would collectively exert policy authority over the major contri-
buting nations comprising the Board of Governors which, in turn, would
exert operational authority over the Director General, the operating
entity of INTERt4ARS. The Board of Users and Investors, working within the
policy framework set down by the Assembly of Parties, would develop
recommendations on operational issues affecting their interests. These
recommendations would be presented to the Board of Governors through the
Board of Users and Investors formal representatives on that Board. (5)
PROVISION FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
Inherent in the concept of establishing a permanent Martian base is
the high probability that such a base would ultimately become a human
settlement of permanent residents. If our history on Earth is any indica-
tion, such permanent residents wlJl eventually desire a controlling voice
in the governing of their activities. We should take this possibility
into account in the initial structure of INTERMARS so as to avoid the
conflicts that plagued colonial establishments in the past.
The best way to do this is to create from the beginning of INTERMARS
a clear mechanism by which the settlers can be represented in its organi-
zational entities and by which the settlers can have majority control of
INTERMARS at an appropriate level of population. Thus, the INTERMARS
charter should contain concepts such as the following: (1) The provi-
sion for a seat for INTERMARS settlers on the Assembly of Parties, the
Board of Governors and the Judicial Tribunal; (2) The provision for the
systematic accumulation of voting shares for INTERMARS settlers based on
the number of settlers who qualify as permanent residents; and (3) Clear
recognition that the success of INTERt4ARS will guarantee that its
settlers will ultimately gain voting control of the organization if they
then desire such control. The net result of these concepts would be the
transition of INTERMARS from an international exploration, management and
investment organization to a true Martian government.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS
The INTERMARS charter must spell out the rights and obligations of
its member nations, users and investors. Although this would be the
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subject of much negotiation, a few points appear to be critical to the
success of the enterprise.
First, the member nations must agree to refrain from the
establishment, or cooperation In the establishment, of any other facili-
ties and services related to Martian bases outside those of INTERNARS
unless it is done jointly with INTERHARS.
Second, the member nations must agree that INTERHARS facilities and
services, including those national facilities and services committed to
INTERMARS by contract, shall be neutral so that in time of hostilities or
threatened hostilities, INTER_RS facilities, services and personnel
would remain secure to peaceful use by all nations without discrimina-
tion. Thus, INTERHARS should not be a target of hostile forces in any
armed conflict.
IMPLEMENTATION
It is never simple to initiate and then implement a new inter-
national concept or organization. INTERNARS wlll be no exception. How-
ever, the establishment of INTERMARS is clearly possible so long as the
commitment of the United States to the establishment of a Martian base is
unequivocal and there is a sincere willingness to search for a fair means
of international participation In such an endeavor. On the other hand, if
the United States Is, or appears to be, hesitant and uncommitted to
either the base or international participation, then It is highly
probable that the Soviet Union and posslbly other nations or groups of
nations wlll "go it alone". If this should happen, a great opportunity
for increased cooperation and trust among otherwise competing nations
will be lost.
With commitment to a Martian base by the United States, the next
logical step would be the convening of an international conference to
consider a draft of an INTERMARS charter. This draft charter should be
the product of extensive bilateral and multilateral discussion between
nations critical to the ultimate political viability of the organization.
The United States clearly would have to take the lead in this early
drafting period, but there is no reason why the final drafting conference
should not be by joint invitation of all interested nations. All nations
should be invited to send official delegates or observers as they are so
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inclined. Potential user or investor entities should be invited as
observers or allowed to participate as members of official delegations.
An obvious question is, "How can the Soviet Union, the Soviet Bloc
nations and the Developing Nations be brought into the development and
implementation of INTERMARS ?" The answer lies in making participation
"an offer they cannot refuse " as has been largely the case with INTELSAT
and INMARSAT. Such an offer is inherent in, first, an unequivocal commit-
ment by the United States, Europe and Japan; second, a clear willingness
to share sovereignty, opportunity and technology; and third, a clear
articulation of direct human, scientific and economic benefits to all
participating nations. Once a reality and once it is clear it will be
successful, INTERNARS will attract many of those nations that may at
first be reluctant to participate. Although conceived as an international
self - regulating monopoly, INTERHARS should always be open to new
members and investors if it is to achieve its broad humanistic goals as
well as its technical and economic purposes.
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